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 Between Postnationality and Postcoloniality:  
Human Rights and the Rights of Non-citizens  
in a “Cosmopolitan Europe” 
Between Postnationality and Postcoloniality 
Chenchen Zhang 
This essay examines how the human rights project1 and the project of the 
European Union (EU) deal with the rights of non-citizens – particularly, the 
rights of undocumented migrants. In doing so, it explores the tensions be-
tween postnational articulations of EU membership, both in terms of norma-
tive expectations and institutional construction, and the post/neocolonial 
condition expressed in the politics of citizenship and migration in today’s 
Europe. I argue that the exclusion and exploitation of postcolonial migrants 
simultaneously underpins and betrays the EU’s ambition to re-establish Eu-
rope as a leading “normative power” (Manners 2002) committed to the value 
of human rights. In fact, “respect for human rights” is enshrined in the Treaty 
of the European Union as one of the key values on which the EU is founded 
and thus constitutes one of the EU’s most significant accession criteria. The 
connections between human rights and the EU project have gained even more 
prominence since the EU was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. However, 
what seems more interesting to me is the fact that the EU project and human 
rights face similar criticisms. 
The critiques of human-rights politics closely resemble those of the post-
national interpretation of the “EUropean” project. Aakash Rathore and Alex 
Cistelecan (2010) distinguish two approaches to problematizing the interna-
tional discourse and regime of human rights: the postcolonial and the post-
Althusserian approach. According to them, the former is primarily framed in 
terms of difference, or of “the discontinuous divide between those who right 
wrongs and those who are wronged” (Spivak 2004: 563); while the latter 
insists on the presumption of equality, and thus a formal inscription of univer-
sality. However, taking a closer look at these claims, we may find that the two 
approaches are complementary rather than contradictory. Each line of argu-
ment is effective in dealing with one aspect of the “paradoxes of human 
rights”, which are frequently referred to in both academic discussions and 
public discourses. On the one hand, humanitarian intervention is charged with 
                                                          
1 By “project”, I mean both a set of international legal documents concerning human rights as 
well as their implementation through the international human rights regime comprising IOs, 
NGOs, international courts, et cetera, and corresponding global narratives of emancipation 
and progress (cf. Baxi 2002). 
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being “humanitarian war”, and even less militant projects of human rights are 
accused of imposing “the ideology of the rich on the poor” (Douzinas 2007: 
33). On the other hand, human rights continue to be one of the most powerful 
instruments employed by the oppressed and the rightless to claim equality, 
rights, and justice. Being neither straightforwardly emancipatory nor unam-
biguously coercive, the paradoxes of human rights, as Gurminder Bhambra 
and Robbie Shilliam (2009) emphasize, derive from their essentially contest-
ed nature. The instrumentalization of human rights language by hegemonic 
powers is therefore no coincidental abuse, but more fundamentally rooted in 
their contested nature. From a postcolonial feminist point of view, Ratna 
Kapur identifies three problematic claims on which the human rights project 
is grounded: a teleological narrative of progress, discriminatory universalism, 
and – most importantly – the questionable construction of the sovereign “sub-
ject” of human rights (Kapur 2006). Along a similar line of critique, the ar-
guments for the postnational nature of European citizenship and for the idea 
of a “cosmopolitan Europe” have been interrogated for their failure to take 
into account Europe’s history of colonial expansionism, and for their insist-
ence on the genuinely “European” character of cosmopolitanism.  
In light of these interrogations, this essay will, first of all, question the 
problematic construction of the subject of human rights and of the citizen, by 
addressing the gap between “Man” and “Citizen” through the Arendtian cri-
tique of human rights. The second section explores EU citizenship as an insti-
tution that reproduces differential inclusion and an essentialist cultural identi-
ty. It also examines the postcolonial condition of Europe from the vantage 
point of the simultaneously politicized and depoliticized “migration ques-
tion”. The precarious status of certain migrants and would-be-migrants re-
veals the incapability of the human rights regime in the face of the state’s 
reassertion of territorial sovereignty. Thus the essay also engages with the 
work of contemporary advocates of cosmopolitanism such as Seyla Benhabib 
(2004), who makes an ardent appeal to follow a Kant-inspired world federal-
ism guided by moral universalism. I, however, contend that neither institu-
tional nor morality-based versions of cosmopolitanism can sufficiently ac-
count for the profound implications of the struggles of non-members for a 
political community. The last section accordingly engages with the political 
significance of migrant subjectivity through Jacques Rancière’s (2004) recon-
figuration of the subject of rights. The ambivalences of human rights politics 
continue to haunt contemporary struggles that both contest and reiterate the 
gap between the universal human and the national citizen. 
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The Rights of Man and the Rights of Citizen  
There is little doubt that the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen is one of the founding texts that defined the modern notion of popular 
sovereignty and the concept of human rights in our time. This concept, how-
ever, is ambiguous and controversial. As Giorgio Agamben points out, it is 
not clear even in the very title of this fundamental document of modern poli-
tics, “whether the two terms homme and citoyen name two autonomous beings 
or instead form a unitary system in which the first is always already included 
in the second” (Agamben 1998: 126). Agamben’s discussion on the “rights of 
Man” unsurprisingly starts by invoking Hannah Arendt, who has offered one 
of the most famous and powerful critiques of human rights after the United 
Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 
1948. Her central argument (Arendt 1949, 1976) is that human rights are 
either the rights of the citizen (as a tautology) or the rights of those who have 
no rights (as a void). 
To make sense of this argument, one must start with Arendt’s understand-
ing of the human condition, that is the Aristotelian idea of human beings as 
speaking (zoon logon echon), and hence as political beings (zoon politikon). 
For Arendt, the discourse of the eighteenth century, by presuming that rights 
spring from the “nature” of man, degrades the political to nature, so that there 
is “nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human” (Arendt 1976: 
299). In other words, “apart from the institution of the community, there 
simply are no humans” (Balibar 2007: 733). Human beings qua human beings 
are never endowed with “inalienable rights”, for all rights depend on “a tacit 
guarantee that the members of a community give to each other” (Arendt 1949: 
34). What is stated in the UDHR as well as in the French Declaration of two 
centuries ago is in fact not human rights, but the rights of equal members of a 
political community. Furthermore, since the nation-state is the only legitimate 
and universalized form of polity of the modern age, what we call human 
rights are in fact the rights of national citizens. However, if there is something 
we can call a “human right” (in singular form), according to Arendt (1976: 
298), that would be the right to be a member of a political community or “the 
right to have rights”. Those who have lost the so-called rights of Man are not 
completely rightless. Rather, absolute rightlessness means the loss of that 
“one” human right; meaning that one no longer belongs to any community 
whatsoever. 
Arendt’s reflections on the post-war effort to “reanimate the idea of hu-
man rights as political foundation” (Menke 2007: 739) are grounded in her 
observations on “stateless people” in the twentieth century. It is the existence 
of these people, who are “forced to live outside the common world” and are 
thrown back “on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation” (Ar-
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endt 1976: 302), which reveals the aporias of human rights. Historical evi-
dence has shown, in her view, that “the restoration of human rights has been 
achieved so far only through the restoration or the establishment of national 
rights” (ibid: 299). 
Thus there is no way for the stateless, or any person who is not recognized 
as a member of a political community, to escape their fate of absolute right-
lessness. To rescue human rights from being either void or tautological, one 
must reconsider the dichotomy underlying the argument that humanity exists 
only by virtue of the political community, now the nation-state, which turns 
bare lives into political beings. The tension between the realm of the political 
(of freedom) and the realm of private life (of necessity), or between bios and 
zoe, sets them in rigid opposition to one another. I shall return later to this 
problematic opposition. For now, another immediate question is also trig-
gered by Arendt’s insights, namely, is citizenship to be conflated with nation-
ality, the only attribute that marks the gap between Man and Citizen? 
The legacy of the French Revolution serves as an important point of refer-
ence in revealing the “different modalities of exclusion that constitutes the 
founding moment of citizenship” (Balibar 2004: 76). The distinction between 
citoyens français and citoyens actifs was immediately introduced in the 1791 
Constitution. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès offered one of the earliest justifica-
tions for such a distinction: “natural rights are those rights for whose preser-
vation society is formed, and political rights are those rights by which society 
is formed”. He continues to state that women, children, foreigners, and those 
“who would not at all contribute to the public establishment must have no 
active influence on public matters” (Sieyès 1985, cited in Agamben 1998: 
130). In other words, they are merely subjects, not citizens in the genuine 
sense of the term. This categorical border drawn between those who are quali-
fied to be citizens and those who are not spells out a political anthropology of 
the modern citizen, or of the human itself.2 The Enlightenment notion of ra-
tionality plays a key role here, as in Locke’s discussions about the relation-
ship between citizenship and property. Property implies first of all “the prop-
erty of the self” (Mezzadra 2006: 33), which is, in Sandro Mezzadra’s words: 
the capacity of an individual to rationally dominate his passions and to discipline himself 
in order to be able to do that labour which constitutes in turn the foundation of every mate-
rial property (ibid: 33). 
The case of the Haitian revolution is frequently referred to by postcolonial 
scholars, yet its familiarity has by no means reduced its impact. When the 
leaders of the Haitian revolution, who called themselves “Black Jacobins”, 
declared their independence from colonial rule and slavery, Monsieur Comte 
                                                          
2 Costas Douzinas claims that a person who enjoys the “rights of man” is above all a “well-
off citizen, a heterosexual, white and urban male” (2007: 54). 
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de Mirabeau’s speech at the National Assembly was in a way only an exag-
gerated version of Sieyès’ philosophy: 
[i]n proportioning the number of deputies to the population of France, we have taken into 
consideration neither the number of our horses nor that of our mules (Trouillot 1995, cited 
in Chatterjee 2007: 29). 
While the narrative of evolutionary history could easily silence the signifi-
cance of the Haitian Revolution, it constantly reminds us that the construction 
of citizenship and of the subject of human rights have never been independent 
of each other. In other words, both “immanent others” – resident aliens, 
women, children, and the poor – and “distant others” – “the uncivilized” – 
constituted the very condition of French citizenship, rather than simply occu-
pying the pre-existing space of the non-citizen. 
Citizens, Non-citizens and the Postcolonial 
If the French Revolution was the most influential event in the establishment 
of the paradigm of national citizenship, the creation of European Union citi-
zenship is regarded by many as an exemplar of postnational or transnational 
citizenship. To be sure, the framework and future of this novel conception of 
citizenship is subject to continuing controversy. Will Kymlicka summarizes 
the two main approaches in this debate as “transcending liberal nationhood” 
and “taming liberal nationhood” (Kymlicka 2008: 130–132). Scholars who 
embrace the former approach expect the EU to be the optimal realization of 
the idea of a “cosmopolitan Europe” (Beck/Grande 2007) and view it as a 
“progressive, human-rights based” (Hansen 2009: 20) normative power, 
showing the rest of the world once again the direction of history. In contrast, 
the latter group holds that the vanishing of “liberal nationhood” is neither 
possible nor desirable in our time (Kymlicka 2008, Bellamy 2008). While 
both camps focus on what is or is not promised, they do not make an effort to 
address what has been forgotten. What Eleonore Kofman asked two years 
after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty has only become more 
relevant today: 
So does this mean that the extension of and debate about the renewal of citizenship in 
Europe will bring advantages to those groups that have been marginalized or excluded 
from it until now? […] [W]ill new political spaces operating at a variety of scales be 
capable of redressing the limits of citizenship and responding to the needs of the principal 
groups in question? (Kofman 1995: 122) 
The key question, in my view, is whether this kind of politics consolidates the 
boundary between the subjects of rights, who have benefited from the present 
citizenship regime, and those who have only limited access to it? Or, to put it 
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more pointedly, does the project of EU citizenship once again reinforce the 
paradox of human rights, namely, that those who are most in need of rights 
have the least of them? 
Let us take a closer look at the formal institution of EU citizenship to ad-
dress these questions: European Union citizenship, by definition, comple-
ments rather than replaces national citizenship; yet this does not prevent it 
from becoming a sui generis form of political membership. Yasemin Soysal 
(1995) has famously spoken of “postnational membership in Europe”, offer-
ing the general enjoyment of civil and social rights to all residents regardless 
of their nationalities, as argued in the previous section. 
The enjoyment of “passive rights” by foreigners, however, was already a 
widely accepted principle in early liberalism. It is therefore the expansion of 
political rights to nationals of other member states that makes citizenship of 
the Union arguably “the only formal constitutionalisation of postnational 
citizenship” (Cornelisse 2010: 108). Most notably, EU citizens have the right 
to vote and stand for election at the municipal level in their state of residence 
as well as within the European Parliament. The “postnational rights package” 
also includes freedom of movement within the territory of the Union as well 
as the right to appeal to the Ombudsman. Yet its complementary nature con-
tinues to maintain and reproduce the differentiating mechanisms of national 
citizenship. The “postnational rights package” is only postnational for the 
nationals of member states, and it remains the case that the sovereign state 
alone decides to whom it grants citizenship. Here we can see once again the 
contradictions the human rights discourse and the EU project seem to share: 
while both are supposedly intended to transcend the limits of the nation-state, 
both implicitly reaffirm the link between nationality and access to rights. 
The political anthropology of the modern subject implied in earlier dis-
courses on citizenship indicates that the structure of inclusion and exclusion 
in the paradigm of national citizenship is not solely based on state territoriali-
ty; nor does it entirely overlap with ethno-cultural boundaries. The different 
images of the Other, or of those who are deemed disqualified to be citizens – 
foreigners, nomads, the propertyless, and indigenous people – mirror one 
another and become integral to the construction of modern citizenship. From 
this perspective, it is clear that the transformation of citizenship in the EU 
does not only involve the promised triumph of “civilization” over “eros” 
enthusiastically spoken of by optimistic commentators,3 but also, more im-
portantly, creates an “increasingly complex system of civic stratifications with 
differential access to civil, economic and social rights” (Kofman 2005: 453), 
depending on different categories of status. There are full-fledged national 
                                                          
3 The Marcusean expression “eros and civilization” is used by Joseph H. H. Weiler (1999: 
324–355) to outline the; key issues in the debates on EU citizenship. He contends that the 
ideal form of European citizenship should be the embodiment of Civilisation, whereas the 
national stands for Eros. 
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citizens, EU citizens, permanent residents, temporary migrant workers, refu-
gees and asylum seekers, ethnic minorities, and so on. But outside all these 
statuses, a group of the population lives “in the absence of any legal recogni-
tion” (Monforte/Dufour 2011: 4). According to the normative understanding 
of the word “person” discussed above they can be deemed “non-persons” 
(Dal Lago 2009). Depending on the context, different terms such as “undoc-
umented”, “illegal”, or “irregular migrants” are used to refer to those people 
who live in a country where they do not hold authorized documents for en-
trance or establishment.4 Being “illegalized” by virtue of their mere presence, 
undocumented migrants are not stateless people in the strict sense of the term. 
Yet, among all excluded groups, they are the most reminiscent of Arendt’s 
warning, more than half a century ago, about being denied that “one human 
right”, or the “right to have rights”. 
This is particularly true in those countries or cities where undocumented 
migrants suffer from the strongest isolation from other social groups and the 
toughest restrictions on their mobility. For instance, the movement restriction 
law of Germany (Residenzpflicht) defines a specific status of Duldung or 
tolerance. People falling under this category are not deported immediately, 
but their mobility is highly restricted, and they can barely leave the district 
they are placed in by the state authority (Monforte/Dufour 2011: 10). In this 
extreme case, not only is the migration “problem” depoliticized as a bureau-
cratic matter of population management, the life of the migrant itself also 
becomes apolitical because of the ubiquitous border that separates it from the 
rest of society.5 The loss of the relevance of speech, as Arendt argues, and the 
loss of all human relationships established by living in a community amounts 
to the loss of the most essential attribute of human life.  
The predicament of undocumented migration reveals the paradox between 
the universal norms of human rights and the exclusive citizenship regime of 
the nation-state through which the articulation of rights is made possible. 
However, this is only part of the story. The perceived “problem” of immigra-
tion has evoked both depoliticizing and politicizing responses in European 
countries and beyond. In debates on migration, political parties, electoral 
campaigns, and very often the mass media tend to employ a rhetoric of na-
tional identity and thereby imply that the “political self-understanding of the 
political community” is at stake (Huysmans 2000: 163). Furthermore, the pro-
cess of European integration has contributed to the creation of what Étienne 
                                                          
4 In this chapter, I use these terms interchangeably, even as I critique the negative connota-
tions attached to some of these categories. I am also aware of the important difference be-
tween “irregular” and “illegal” migrants in legal terms, which is concerned with whether the 
state considers the violation of its established norms on the entry and residence of foreign 
nationals as a “criminal act” or as a “statutory offence” (Sciortino 2004). 
5 One could also argue that the very process of depoliticizing certain groups of the population 
is essential to the maintenance of the politicized norms on which the biopolitics of sover-
eignty is grounded. 
250 Chenchen Zhang  
Balibar calls a “new racism” that is at once “postcolonial and postnational” 
(Balibar 2004: 122). This is directly related to the formulation of “a European 
identity” at the supranational level since the 1970s, which has been consid-
ered by Europhile politicians and some democratic theorists to be indispensa-
ble to the realization of European citizenship. The concept of “European 
identity” has been criticized for mobilizing an essentialist conception of cul-
tural identity, which inevitably involves “Othering” the rest of the world as 
well as Europe’s colonial past. Fatima El-Tayeb remarks that this politics of 
migration functions simultaneously as “a threat uniting the beleaguered Euro-
pean nations and as trope shifting the focus away from Europe’s unresolved 
identity crisis” (El-Tayeb 2008: 650). Just as the removal of internal borders 
has to be accompanied by the strengthening of external borders in the geo-
graphical space of the Schengen area, the fabrication of a supranational iden-
tity advocated by the EU entails a similar process of redrawing identitarian 
borders in the membership space.6 
Thus, “illegal” migration is not merely an administrative denomination 
that classifies a group of foreigners as “illegal” by virtue of their presence. It 
carries immediately and intrinsically racial and economic connotations. This 
is indeed not entirely new: racialized immigration filtering was already sys-
tematically practiced in the colonies of the British Empire. In Natal in 1897, 
for example, when migration restrictions were first introduced on the basis of 
property and language proficiency, the prime minister of the self-governing 
colony had to explain to the imperial authorities that “it never occurred to me 
for a single minute that it should ever be applied to English immigrants”, and 
that “the main object of the proposed law is to prevent Natal from being 
flooded by undesirable immigrants from India” (Cole 2000: 30–31). Howev-
er, the postcolonial condition of Europe in our time is not only about the “we 
are here, because you were there” logic. The perception of fear of and the 
subsequent control over migration “flows” reveal that, while colonialism is 
considered a bygone phenomenon, the absolute spatial and temporal borders 
that formerly existed between the “civilized” colonizer and the “barbarian” 
colonized are now being reproduced at the heart of the metropolis (Mezzadra 
2006). In addition to the border politics within European metropolises, the 
externalization of Europe’s border policies to migrant-sending countries as 
well as the role the low-paid migrant labor force in post-industrialized Europe 
demonstrate the historical continuities of the postcolonial logic. 
                                                          
6 Stein Rokkan (1999: 104) makes a distinction between the “geographical space” and the 
“membership space” in his analytical framework of boundary-building. 
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Human Rights, Migrant Rights, and the Postnational 
Despite the incapability of international and European human rights regimes 
to adequately protect the human rights of immigrants, the respect for funda-
mental rights is a principle inherent in the EU’s constitutional order. As was 
officially stated during the European Council meeting in Tampere in 1999, 
the project of European integration is rooted “in a shared commitment to 
freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law”, 
and this freedom should not “be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the 
Union’s own citizens” (European Council 1999: paragraph 9). However, it 
was also maintained that defending such a freedom necessitates “a consistent 
control of external borders to stop illegal immigration” and fighting those 
who organize the latter (ibid). For normative political theorists, this raises the 
challenge of how to transform moral principles into concrete institutional 
arrangements in a normatively justifiable manner. On the other hand, political 
theorists like Wendy Brown ask instead whether human rights achieve only 
their declared goals and nothing more (cf. Brown 2004)? Let us start with the 
normative perspective. 
In The Rights of Others (2004), Benhabib assesses the transformation of 
citizenship in the EU after a nuanced philosophical analysis of the different 
justifications of rights. She offers a “postmetaphysical reformulation” of the 
Kantian principle of rights through “discourse ethics”. This places emphasis 
on the discursive processes through which norms, and especially the institu-
tional arrangements based on these norms, are validated by all those who 
would be affected. Within this theoretical framework, her evaluation of the 
achievements and limits of the “rights regime” in contemporary Europe is 
rather modest. On the one hand, she observes a disaggregation of citizenship 
and a dynamic “toward narrowing the divide separating human rights from 
citizens’ rights” within the EU and assesses that the trends toward integrating 
third-country nationals into the EU’s rights regime are “irreversible”. On the 
other hand, she admits that even within the EU, “one of the most developed 
rights regimes of our world” (2004: 168), the degree of human rights viola-
tions against refugees and asylum seekers remains significantly high. Along 
with other normative political theorists, Benhabib seeks to link universal 
norms with historically established institutions by appealing to the spirit of 
Kant, foregrounding a combination of moral universalism and cosmopolitan 
federalism. The latter still requires democratic nationhood as its foundation, 
with the demos of a nation-state being bound by democratic attachments ra-
ther than cultural identity. However, even Benhabib herself is not unaware 
that universal human rights and sovereignty claims of the state are more often 
than not in conflict (ibid: 69). In the context of exile and asylum, she rightful-
ly points out that although the right to seek asylum is recognized as a human 
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right, “the obligation to grant asylum continues to be jealously guarded by 
states as a sovereign privilege” (ibid, italics in original). As many legal schol-
ars have pointed out, the protection provided by the international human 
rights regime to undocumented migrants is considerably constrained, precise-
ly because international conventions and organizations are fundamentally 
based on the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
Benhabib’s cosmopolitanism is nonetheless an ambitious attempt to rec-
oncile the conflict between universal moral principles that ought to be applied 
to all – including those “who do not belong” – and the republican values of 
bounded communities. Other versions of contemporary cosmopolitanism, in 
contrast, tend to either disregard the issue of migrant rights altogether, or 
subordinate it to a sort of “cosmopolitan justice”, or rather a particular inter-
national order. For instance, John Rawls famously claims that his theory per-
tains only to the ideal democratic society, which should be viewed as a “com-
plete and closed social system” (Rawls 1993: 40). He does not deem it neces-
sary to take into account problems such as “unjust wars, immigration, and 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction” (ibid: 12). Another example 
is Ulrich Beck, who, in his discussion of the “success” of European integra-
tion, advocates the idea of mobility of whole societies7 to overcome methodo-
logical nationalism (Beck/Grande 2007: 121–122). Yet, when it comes to 
human mobility, he contends that in order to lessen the pressure of immigra-
tion in advanced societies, we should anticipate a mode of cosmopolitan dis-
tribution, wherein low-skilled jobs are exported from rich to poor countries, 
thereby making the need to look for work on a different continent unneces-
sary (Beck 2006: 109). This “cosmopolitan” imaginary is not only hindered 
by “a state-oriented mode of global space” (Campbell/Shapiro 1999: xii), but 
also takes for granted the reproduction of structural inequalities in a hierar-
chical inter-state order.  
The external border controls of the EU most acutely highlight the failure 
of human rights – both in terms of moral principle and as an international 
regime – to achieve the minimalist goal of “saving lives”. At the same time, 
they reveal the relations of power underlying the political rhetoric of human 
rights. Practices of deportation and detention across European countries and 
the high number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea under the watch 
of national military forces8 are all shameful features of EU policy in connec-
tion with the management of external borders, whose primary goal is to en-
                                                          
7 According to Beck and Edgar Grande, the traditional concept of society and the social 
theory this concept is based upon only recognizes mobility within societies, while being un-
able to address the idea of the mobility of whole societies. They argue that the enlargement 
of the EU offers a unique opportunity to facilitate this mobility through the process of “bor-
der-transcending preventive Europeanisation” (Beck/Grande 2007: 122, italics in original). 
8 See, for example, the briefing paper Hidden Emergency prepared by Judith Sunderland 
(2012) for Human Rights Watch. 
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sure “a high and uniform level of checks on persons and surveillance” (Coun-
cil of the European Union 2004). Although the ruling of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy9 is considered 
to be ground-breaking in protecting the human rights of migrants on the high 
seas (Hessbruegge 2012, Scheinin 2012), it ironically also reaffirms that the 
implementation of international human rights law has not altered and contin-
ues to accord with the territorial configuration of state sovereignty. The Court 
ordered the Italian government to pay monetary compensation to the victims 
and to obtain assurances from the Libyan authorities, which have proven 
difficult to secure.10 Even if the compensation was to be paid and if Libya was 
to ensure the freedom of the applicants from abuse, the divide between those 
who suffer, those who rescue, and those who are termed “evil” is once again 
reconstituted in processes of this kind, as convincingly argued by Costas 
Douzinas. The victims are always powerless, “faceless and nameless”, and the 
goodwill of the “savers” to right wrongs in no way puts this divide into ques-
tion (Douzinas 2007: 69). 
Reconfiguring the Rights in Human Rights 
In this last section, I will turn to the post-Althusserian, or post-structuralist 
approach in order to redefine the “rights” in human rights and to address the 
political significance of the rights of non-citizens. Such an approach has been 
representatively articulated, for example, in Rancière’s critique of Arendt,11 
and in his attempt to identify the real “subject” of the Rights of Man (cf. 
Rancière 2004). According to Rancière, by completely depoliticizing the 
stateless – those whom “nobody wants even to oppress” (Arendt 1976: 296), 
Arendt excludes the possibility for stateless people to act in the public realm. 
This is viewed by Rancière as a “vicious circle”, since it reasserts the distinc-
tion between “those who are worthy or not worthy of doing politics that was 
presupposed at the very beginning” (Rancière 2004: 306). The root of this 
vicious circle, according to Rancière, can be traced back to her rigid distinc-
tion between the private and the public, between labor and action, and be-
tween liberation and freedom (ibid). The subjects of human rights, for Arendt, 
                                                          
9 European Court of Human Rights. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (2012). ECHR Applica-
tion no. 27765/09. 
10 For instance, one of the justifications put forward by the Italian government for not paying 
the full compensation ordered was that it could not ascertain the whereabouts of some of the 
victims. This was criticized by prominent Italian legal practitioners and activists during a 
consultation between the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, civil 
society actors, and academics in Florence in October 2012. 
11 This critique is not completely fair; see, for example, Gündoğ du (2011). 
254 Chenchen Zhang  
consequently could only be members of a political community in which indi-
viduals “recognize each other as equal and distinct” (Schaap 2011: 34). 
Rancière, seeing this as problematic, tries to revisit the question of the 
subject of the rights of Man, and hence the subject of politics as well. He 
contends that the rights of man are not 
the rights of a single subject that would be at once the source and the bearer of the rights 
and would only use the rights that she or he possesses (Rancière 2004: 202). 
It is the subject, or more accurately “the process of subjectivization, that 
bridges the interval between two forms of the existence of those rights” 
(Rancière 2004: 302). The first form of the existence of rights, according to 
Rancière, is the existence of written rights that inscribe a free and equal 
community, and the second refers to the rights of those “who make something 
of that inscription”, who initiate a dispute about what is given (ibid: 303). 
This would imply that they could make claims when deprived of the rights 
accorded by the Declaration of Rights. And they could demonstrate, through 
political action, “that they had the rights that the constitution denied to them, 
that they could enact those rights” (2004: 304). Political subjects are not 
determinate subjects, nor is the “human” in human rights. Rather, these 
emerge within the process of subjectivization, in the gap opened by the dif-
ference between man and citizen, or between the inscriptions of rights and the 
instances of their denial. Instances of denial provide moments for verifying 
the presupposition of equality – equality, in Rancière’s view, is “not the end 
to attain, but a point of departure” (1991: 138). The subjects of human rights 
are not proclaimed equal, but are always already equal, and the value of this 
presupposition is only actualized in its attempted verification.  
The relevance of the international conventions on human rights thus does 
not lie in the expectation that they could ensure the realization of those rights, 
nor in the possibility that international human rights organizations could 
achieve this task. They are relevant in the sense that citizens of states ruled by 
illegitimate laws or by the arbitrariness of governments can appeal to them 
against their laws or governments, and undocumented migrants who are de-
nied all rights and legal personhood can invoke them to claim their rights. It is 
through the very action of demonstrating that “they have the rights they have 
not” that they are enacting the rights they do not have. In doing so, they 
“demonstrate the reality of both their equality as speaking animals and of 
their inequality within the social order” (Schaap 2011: 34). Rethinking rights 
and the subject of rights through such an approach enables us to overcome, at 
least partially, the ontological divide between “the rescuer” and “the victim” 
in humanitarianism, and thereby to rescue human rights from humanitarian 
rights. 
It is not surprising that such an agency-centered approach to rights has 
been fruitfully employed in the growing literature on critical citizenship stud-
ies. The influential “sans-papiers” movement in France, the nationwide 
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demonstrations of undocumented migrants in the United States, the hunger 
strikes in the makeshift migrant camps of Calais, and various other forms of 
migrant movements worldwide provide illuminating empirical resources for 
us to register the political subjectivity of irregular migrants, refugees, and 
minorities. However, the tension between abstract equality and particularistic 
difference inherent in the discourse of rights remains visible in these forms of 
mobilization, for they have to rely on “the vocabularies of race, ethnicity, 
religion, and culture” (Soguk 1997: 323) to accommodate themselves to the 
processes of statist territorial democracy. The claim-making of the undocu-
mented must appeal to both the universal through such transnational slogans 
as “No Man is illegal”, and the particular through the rhetoric of French or 
British nationalism. It is thus declared in the Manifesto of the Sans-Papiers: 
we came to France because we had been told that France was the “homeland of the Rights 
of Man”…[and] we dreamed of freedom (Manifesto of the Sans-Papiers, cited in Hayter 
2000: 143). 
Migrants also emphasize the historical links between their home countries and 
the country in which they take up struggles: 
Where do we come from, we Sans-Papiers of Saint-Bernard? […] [w]e are all from former 
French colonies […] So it’s not an accident that we find ourselves in France: our countries 
have had a relationship with France for centuries (Cissé 1997). 
Rancière’s post-structuralist interpretation of migrant subjectivity is based on 
the abstractness of human rights and the formal inscription of universality 
enabled by this abstractness. However, while migrant struggles in reality do 
use the language of universal rights, they often simultaneously “undermine 
and reinscribe the territorial and citizenship boundaries against which they 
struggle” (McNevin 2006: 146, italics in original). It is crucial to 
acknowledge that every process of political subjectivization, which according 
to Rancière’s re-conceptualization of the rights of Man is the only way to 
restore the validity of human rights, must take place in concrete historical, 
spatial, and socio-cultural contexts. 
Conclusion 
The politics of citizenship and migration in the European Union reveal the 
paradox between the universalistic promise of postnationalism and the territo-
rially confined citizenship regime on one hand, and highlights the postcoloni-
al condition of Europe within global power structures on the other. In this 
essay, I have sought to examine postcolonial and post-structuralist critiques of 
human rights to critically engage with these issues. Whereas the former focus 
on inequalities and domination, the latter re-appeal to the presupposition of 
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formal equality. Postcolonial perspectives enable us to analyze the ways in 
which EU citizenship is constructed through differentiating and Othering, and 
to understand the predicament of undocumented migrants in Europe as more 
than a consequence of merely “the national order of things” (Malkki 1995). 
Moreover, the normative articulation of a postnational Europe draws on the 
cosmopolitan ideal of the European Enlightenment, which reinforces “an 
intellectual investment in the idea of a common European civilization” 
(O’Brien 1997: 2). Historically, the civilizational superiority generated by 
such an investment was mobilized to legitimize colonialism as well as exclu-
sionary regimes of citizenship and rights. A contemporary cosmopolitanism 
informed by this Enlightenment ideal remains challenged by the inherent 
conflicts between universal norms and sovereign statehood. So long as they 
disregard exclusionary and differentialist moments in the idea of universal 
rights, cosmopolitan responses to global migration are likely to remain largely 
limited to top-down efforts liable to reproduce existing power relations; they 
are also unlikely to sufficiently appreciate the political significance of migrant 
agency. 
Through a post-structuralist reconfiguration of rights, we may account for 
migrant rights as human rights. Or rather, human rights as the rights of those 
who put the rights inscribed in law to the test by their rights claims. Migrant 
subjectivity is continuously caught in the paradox between universality and 
particularistic categories of race, ethnicity, religion, and so forth. However, in 
the face of the contested nature of human rights, if we are indeed optimistic 
enough to envisage a “cosmopolitanism to come” (Douzinas 2007), it has to 
be born out of this paradox. It must recognize one’s desire for and resistance 
to belonging, thus conceiving of an identity that is not identical to itself.12 
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